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AbstractThe accident rate of rotorcraft has improved signiﬁcantly over the years but at a slow pace, and in any casethe number of accident per ﬂight hours is one or two order on magnitude higher than that of commercialaircraft. This could be reasonably related to the inherent higher risk associate with rotorcraft operations.This represent a strong evidence of the necessity to introduce airworthiness operation standards also inthe rotorcraft community, as an effective mean to improve safety records, borrowing the experience donein the commercial air transport community with the introduction of ETOPS. In this paper a ﬁrst proposal ofdevelopment of a safety standard for helicopter offshore operation is discussed together with the possiblesupport to this development that could be given by the EU H2020 NITROS project.
1. INTRODUCTION
Helicopter accident and fatal helicopter accidentrates have fallen for three consecutive year since2014. This is clearly shown in the report of the In-ternational Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) presentedat the HAI Heli-Expo this year 1. However, the cur-rent rate is still too high to be considered accept-able. Commercial airplane ﬂights have a rate of 26fatal and non-fatal accidents per 10 Million move-ments2, which means about 13 accidents per 10mil-lion ﬂights.* Already in 2000 Harris et al.3 estimatedthat it was ten times more likely to be involved in
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*Assuming that the average ﬂight time is close to 2 hours.
an accident if ﬂying in a helicopter than in turbo-jet ﬁxed-wing aircraft, while Fox in 20044 gave asﬁgure for the accident rate for Bell helicopters of3.9 per 100,000 hours, that is two order of magni-tude higher than that of commercial airplane.† Inany case, the comparison of the safety records be-tween commercial aeroplane and rotorcraft opera-tion shown in the Annual Safety Review 2017 editedby EASA is clear2 both in terms of global accidentrates and in terms of fatal vs. non-fatal accidents.Of course airliners operate from airport to air-port, while rotorcraft are employed in many com-plex operations: offshore operations, search andrescue, coastguard, ﬁreﬁghting, disaster relief, ter-ritorial control, monitoring and inspection, heavy-lift support to construction and other sectors, aerialﬁlming and media support, etc., and this makes ahuge difference in the realistic safety targets thatcan be achieved, given the signiﬁcant time spentclose to terrain and obstacles, often in harsh envi-ronment. However, the inherent higher complexityand risk of operations should be considered as an
†Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to retrieve data on acci-dent per ﬂight hours that is the typical safety rate used in avia-tion, because it is still problematic to collect ﬂight hours for theglobal helicopter ﬂeet.
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incentive to develop operation standards, despitethe large variety of type of operations may makethis objective more diﬃcult to achieve.To better frame the current rapidly evolving situa-tion, as predicted by the 20-year Annual Forecast bythe american Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),rotorcraft hours ﬂown are expected to grow at arate of 2.2% per year‡, given the strategic roles cov-ered in many critical community services by rotor-craft. And this rate of grow does not consider thepossible explosion of on-demand and personal avi-ation services for urban mobility based on VerticalTake-Off and Landing (VTOL) air vehicles that arecurrently attracting large investments worldwide5.An interesting proposal on how to properly man-age risk, and thus to increase safety, has beenlaunched by Leonardo Helicopters6,7. The idea is todevelop design and operation rules for helicoptersin a fashion proportional to the speciﬁc risk faced.Safety improvements could not be linked just to air-worthiness of the design but they should be linkedto operational risk. The risk in fact is the combina-tion of the predicted severity – i.e. criticality – andlikelihood – i.e. probability – of the potential effectof a hazard8, and so it is a concept inherently asso-ciated with a speciﬁc operation. In fact, risk is tightlyrelated to operation and should be considered func-tion of many parameters related to the environ-ment where the operation takes place, populated,congested, hostile of mountain areas. This meansthat the higher is the risk of the speciﬁc operationto be performed the more stringent should be thedesign requirements.Leonardo launched the effort to set up anExtended range Helicopter Operation Standard(EHOPS)6. The Leonardo proposal is based on acommercial airplane operation standard successstory, ETOPS (Extended-range Twin-engine Opera-tional Performance Standards), introduced in 1985to apply an overall level of operational safety fortwin-engined aeroplanes which was consistent withthat of the three and four-engined aeroplanes theonly allowed to ﬂy transoceanic routes at that time,to which no restrictions were applied. Today’s ruleestablishes regulations governing the design, oper-ation and maintenance of certain airplanes oper-ated on ﬂights that ﬂy long distances from an ad-equate airport9.A similar regulation associated to a speciﬁc oper-ation in order to quantify the risk and bring it to anacceptable level could be developed for rotorcrafttoo. In this case the proposal of Leonardo7 is totackle one of the most hostile environment for ro-
‡https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/ retrieved March 15, 2018
Figure 1: Offshore operation for rotorcraft.
Figure 2: Percentage of fatal accident by type of op-eration. Source EASA published in IHST 2018 World-wide Partner Panel. 1
torcraft operation that is the offshore case (see ﬁg-ure 1), even thought the analysis reported by EASAin the IHST 2018 report 1 shows that offshore is def-initely not the largest contributor to the number offatal accident in rotorcraft, see Figure 2.NITROS – Network for Innovative Training on RO-torcraft Safety§ – is a project launched in 2016 underthe umbrella of the Marie Sklodowska Curie JointDoctorates Programme in European Union aims totrain (up to doctoral level) a new generation of tal-ented young engineers to become future specialistsin developing innovative approaches to address ro-torcraft safety issues 10. To increase the awarenessof safety issues of the researchers that are partic-ipating to the NITROS project it has been decidedto perform this assessment of the feasibility of theEHOPS for offshore operations as a team work.The paper present the foundations of the inves-tigation to be performed by the twelve researcherson the feasibility of the EHOPS Standard and on theelements that should be included in this standard.
§https://www.nitros-ejd.org/
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2. CURRENT STATUS OF ROTORCRAFT FLIGHTSAFETY
The safety of rotorcraft is clearly related to uniquemissions they are asked to perform. Rotorcraft areemployed in many complex operations close to ter-rain and obstacles and in harsh environments, andthis makes a huge difference in the realistic safetytargets that can be achieved. Additionally, rotor-craft have naturally (i.e. without any artiﬁcial stabil-ity augmentation) limited stability; they have signif-icant cross-couplings of control making, for sometypes, potentially diﬃcult for the pilot to operatewithout losing control in harsh environmental con-ditions; when the visual conditions degrade and thepilot has diﬃculty seeing the terrain and horizonreferences, there is a high risk of spatial disorien-tation, with consequent departure from the desiredﬂight trajectory. So, it seems very important to con-sider safety not as simply related to airworthinessof the design but linked also to operational risk.Part failure represents a very small fraction of ac-cidents, so airworthiness problems contributes lit-tle to the causes that must be primarily sought inthe interaction of the vehicle with the other elementof the aircraft4,2. In an analysis of accident statisticsbetween 1995-2010 11, only 5% of accidents belong toairworthiness failures, while 40% are related to pi-lot awareness, skills and judgment, 10% are relatedalso to the risk associated with environmental con-ditions and another 5% to mission risk associatedwith hostile areas of operations.In the ’50s and the ’60s the US Air Force Ballis-tic Missile Division introduced the concept of systemsafety, where one of the key aspects was that ev-erything contributes to the response of the systemand so all failures— of parts of the aircraft but alsoof the human operators, the management system,and the environment— affect the ﬁnal outcome ofthe system4. In the helicopter world most of thetimes the system has been considered the entireaircraft4. However, to manage risk properly, and soincrease safety, it is important to take into accountthe other elements that contribute to the systemand consequently develop an approach to safetythat is linked to operational risk. The designer mustbe able to identify clearly the risks associated withany design choice in relation to the different opera-tive scenarios. Additionally, it will allow to erase themyths such as "Twin-engine helicopters are alwayssafer than single engine helicopters. The rest of theaircraft other than the engines are the same on sin-gle or twin-engine helicopters, so it can be disre-garded"4, that tend to ignore that risk is intimatelyassociated with the type of mission, and that in spe-ciﬁc situations with the appropriate safety assess-
ment a ﬂight on a single engine rotorcraft could besafer.Disproving such a myth in aviation was per-fectly exempliﬁed by the development of the ETOPS.
3. ETOPS A SUCCESSFUL STORY
The ETOPS is a set of regulations for passenger air-craft developed as an exception to overcome the ef-fect of the FAA 121.161, denominated the 60-minuterule. In fact in 1953, the FAA adopted a rule that pro-hibited aircraft with less than four engines from ﬂy-ing more than 60minutes to reach the nearest suit-able airport in response to an engine failure.The 60minutes rule was the logical consequenceof the low reliability of piston engine, and of an un-conditional faith on the general rule that more en-gines are always better, no matter how the rest ofthe systems of the aircraft are conceived.The higher reliability of jet engines, that requiredalso less maintenance, sparked the idea on aircraftmanufactures to develop airliner with less enginesthat could bemore fuel-eﬃcient and have lower op-erative costs and better operational ﬂexibility. Thisidea was supported by airlines who saw the eco-nomic advantage.The initial opposition of the regulator was notspeciﬁcally related to engine reliability, but more tothe capabilities of a single engine to power criticalsub-systems while being the only source of thrust 12.A clear example was related to de-icing systems: op-erating an aircraft on single engine will force to ﬂyat peak icing altitude, so it was correct to ask if theonly active engine was enough to power electric, hy-draulic avionic and de-incing systems.In July 1984 the FAA issues a draft advisory cir-cular for twin-engine extended operations includingsix main design criteria:
1. show an acceptable low risk of double enginefailure from independent causes;
2. demonstrate the reliability of the propulsionsystem by in-service experience;
3. ensure that critical systems could be opera-tional if engine fails;
4. assess the air carrier andmanufacturer’smain-tenance programs to demonstrate that is ableto reach the reliability level required;
5. review the training, operation and mainte-nance programs of airlines;
6. apply fail-safe criteria for design of critical sys-tems.
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Interestingly, the introduction of ETOPS did notrely simply on a request of higher reliability of en-gines, but sparked the attention to the redundancyof systems, general reliability and also to trainingand maintenance procedure. In the end, it resultedin a standard designed to preclude failure and mal-function that could cause a diversion from the in-tended mission, or in case diversion is necessary toperform it in the safest way 12. This called for severalchanges:
• the aircraft and engine manufactures whereforce to follow design process that result inhigher reliability;
• the airlines were required to qualify indepen-dently for extended range operations, provid-ing detailed information about the mainte-nance, inspection and replacement programs.
Several important safety feature where enhancedwith the constraint to keep the level of safety forthe length of the longest possible diversion, like on-board ﬁre suppression systems.The beneﬁt of this risk-assessment-based ap-proach, lead to application of ETOPS approach toall aircraft. Airlines started to apply ETOPS practiceto ETOPS-exempt aircraft, and the same happenedfor design procedures. In 2007 the deﬁnition of theacronym was changed to simply "extended oper-ations" to clarify that the set of rules developedshould be applied to all passenger airplanes withmore than one engine.So, it is possible to state that the introductionof ETOPS "improved the safety of commercial avi-ation: no ETOPS ﬂight has been lost because of adanger that ETOPS was meant to address" 12. Ad-ditionally, all actors gained advantages. The man-ufactures where allowed to better market aircraft,in fact twin-engine products have signiﬁcantly in-creased the number of ﬂying aircraft. Airlines havemore ﬂexible aircraft, that better satisfy the requestof passengers of more direct ﬂights. The regulationauthorities promoted safety in civil aviation, and thesociety as a whole beneﬁted the faster diffusionof smaller, more fuel-eﬃcient airplanes. Currently,more twin-engine aircraft cross the trans-oceanicroutes that three- or four-engine aircraft.
4. EHOPS CERTIFICATION FOR HELICOPTER OP-ERATION
The application of ETOPS principles to Helicopters,in what has been termed Extended Helicopter Op-erations (EHOPS) has been recently proposed in Ref.7.
The application of this idea to offshore tasks isparticularly challenging. Offshore operations per-formed by helicopters are typically related to: move-ment of people to and from their workplaces onoffshore facilities and vessels; equipment inspec-tion; freight transportation; emergency evacuation;search and rescuemissions; construction andmain-tenance of offshore wind farms; construction andmaintenance of offshore oil and gas platforms; var-ious ship operations. All those operations pose spe-ciﬁc risk to helicopter operations related to the ad-verse environment where they are performed.The starting point to understand the possibility toapply the ETOPS approach to rotorcraft offshore op-erations is the analysis of the AMC-20-69. It is possi-ble to map the different elements discussed in thisstandard to the following seven topics:
1. System requirements and design
2. Safety Requirements for EHOPS
3. Maintenance Requirements for EHOPS
4. RFM Procedures for EHOPS
5. MMEL/MEL for EHOPS operation
6. Human factors and operational aspects
7. Training aspects
An initial analysis of all those apects could befound in Ref. 7.It is important to note the large emphasis thatthe ETOPS design criteria pose on fail-safe criteriafor design. In helicopters there are several systemswhere single Hazardous and Catastrophic failuremodes are possible, as either single failure modesor single failure modes in association with failureof monitoring system. Those are particularly criticalfor the parts that belong to the Rotor System, in-cluding the Control Chain and the Rotor Drive Sys-tem.In this case the approach to be followed could notbe based on reliability by redundancy or fail-safe ap-proaches, as often used in ETOPS, but more on highreliability obtained as combination of design, main-tenance, inspection and replacement requirements.Damage Tolerance including safety margins vs ex-ternal, maintenance induced damages and manu-facturing ﬂaws, must be combined with appropriateand reliable health monitoring systems to reach anacceptable risk of failure to be demonstrated, alsoby in-service experience as done for ETOPS.Additionally, further detailed analysis in the caseof helicopters with respect to airplanes will be re-quired for take-off and landing procedures. Start-ing from the deﬁnition of operations categorization
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based on Take-Off and Landing operations, Perfor-mance Class 1 & 2 (PC1 & PC2) are scrutinized in thecontext of Off-Shore operations. Both performanceclasses require that in case of a critical power-unitfailure, performance must be available to enablethe helicopter to safely continue to an appropri-ate landing area, unless the failure occurs duringtake-off or landing. In PC1, a failure before reach-ing the take-off decision point (TDP) or after pass-ing the landing decision point (LDP) must leave thehelicopter with the capability to land within the re-jected take-off or landing area. In PC2, however, itis suﬃcient that the helicopter is able to make aforced landing. PC2 does not seem adequate, sinceit exposes the helicopter to potentially catastrophicrisks due to engine failure, which are not paral-leled by analogous classiﬁcations for CommercialAir Transport (CAT) related to ﬁxed wing aircraft.PC2 operations are currently permitted by opera-tion regulations with additional measures that areintended to mitigate the risk exposure associatedwith some engine failures.In any case, in the deﬁnition of extended oper-ation standards, helicopters present an additionaldegree of freedom that should be accounted: thecapability to land in areas not speciﬁcally designedas landing areas. In offshore operations, continuingto an appropriate landing area might represent toostrict a requirement. Helicopters for off-shore oper-ations have the capability to ditch. The applicationof ETOPS principles requires one to consider failuremodes that might force the helicopter to land onwater.Of course, ditching is less desirable than land-ing on an appropriate area. As such, two typesof analysis need to be taken into account. In theﬁrst scenario, an appropriate landing area must bereached. In the second one, successfully ditching insafe conditions is considered. The primary objectivewould be to use ETOPS principles to avoid ditchingin the ﬁrst place. Both analyses aim at deﬁning whatchanges are required in the design of the helicopterto reach an acceptable diversion distance and timeto reach what in the context of EHOPS is equiva-lent to the alternate landing site of ETOPS, i.e. a safelanding site as the preferred choice or, as a secondchoice, a safe place for successful ditching and sub-sequent rescue.Typically, helicopters operate within muchshorter distances, compared to large jet airlin-ers. However, they also ﬂy at much lower cruisespeeds, which may further reduce in case of oneengine inoperative (OEI) conditions. Furthermore,especially in case of off-shore operations, theremight be no alternate landing sites, or they mightbe at distances at least comparable to that of the
departure or destination sites. As such, very oftenan alternate landing site is either not availableor not preferable, in terms of distance and time,unless the closest between the departure or desti-nation sites become unavailable for other reasons(e.g. weather conditions). Typically, in those cases,diversion times between 30min and 2 hours wouldbe necessary to avoid ditching. However, such aduration is beyond the current and foreseeablesafety objective of critical systems, like rotors andtransmission, in terms of residual risk of continuousoperation in case of many types of ﬁrst failures.Consequently, many operations might not meetthe requirement of reaching a safe landing site.In those cases, the distance and time required toreach a place for safe ditching and subsequentrescue is the only possibility to deﬁne a possibleEHOPS route. Considering the limited range andspeed of helicopters, compared to those of largejet airliners, typical ﬂights can be considered localin terms of variability of geographical and environ-mental characteristics, making the deﬁnition of riskscenarios of EHOPS operations easier for speciﬁcgeographic areas and seasons. These aspects canplay a very important role in deﬁning the sustain-ability of commercial operations, which involvesthe capability of successfully operating routinelywith suﬃciently high success rates, in terms ofaccomplishing the mission instead of aborting it,regardless of, e.g., environmental conditions.Scenarios can signiﬁcantly change, within a spe-ciﬁc geographical area, for example because of theseason. Different seasons imply different expectedaverage weather conditions, for example in termsof likelihood of encountering icing conditions, orof passenger and crew survival time in water aftera successful ditching that results in an evacuationof the helicopter. Encounters with icing conditionscould result in cancellation of the ﬂight, in case thehelicopter is not equipped with appropriate anti-icing systems (both in terms of capabilities and re-liability), whereas the need to ensure safe rescuein case of ditching would require the route to re-main within a prescribed maximum distance fromavailable search and rescue (SAR) services in the re-lated Risk Scenario. Allowing the possibility of safeditching alleviates the requirement of long diversiontimes, but introduces the need to update the he-licopter in order to provide adequate ditching ca-pabilities, along with the related requirements onoperations, maintenance and training. The analysisof the risk scenario could introduce further limita-tions, e.g. on the visual conditions (restricting op-erations to daylight conditions). Other elements inthe risk scenario that may be characteristic of thetype of operations are, for example, bird impact,
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which unlike large ﬁxed wing jet airliners is not lim-ited to take-off and landing, but may be presentduringmuch longer operation phases, and lightningstrikes. Several types of reliability issues need to beaddressed: - engine reliability in relation to loss ofthrust control (LOTC) and in ﬂight shut down (IFSD)rates, with special attention to the risk of dual en-gine failure in one ﬂight - system level reliability, in-cluding reliability of secondary / back-up systems orwarning systems which, in case of false indications,could induce the crew to carry out an unnecessaryditching - capability of design features targeted toallow continued operation in the event of a failure(e.g. ﬁre suppression, main gear box (MGB) loss ofoil capability, time-limited electrical system capabil-ity).Periodic reviews, at least yearly, of the risk sce-narios is necessary, since some of the sources ofrisk may vary. EASA’s Annual Safety Review, for ex-ample, is a tool that may be used to produce SafetyRisk Portfolios based on events happened duringthe preceding years.The deﬁnition of agreed risk scenarios for EHOPSoperations is a key element for innovating the ap-proach to enhancing helicopter operations, whichmust be matched with a Safety Objective. Meetingsuch objective requires combining compliance todesign requirements by the OEM with complianceto operational requirements by the operator. Froman operator’s point of view, the Mission RelatedSafety Objective of a single mission may need tobe complemented with a Cumulative Safety Objec-tive, which takes into account the number of ﬂightsperformed to carry out the intended business in agiven period of time. Finally, a key aspect is vali-dation of the initial assumptions that are inevitablymade both for design and operations. As for ETOPS,also EHOPS requires a feedback of service data, toconﬁrm or reﬁne the initial assumptions based onexperience. It is clear that EHOPSmanagement pro-cedures are as important as EHOPS requirements.
5. NITROS CONTRIBUTION TO EHOPS SET UP
In NITROS, a unique cross-disciplinary researchand training program was set up encompassingControl Engineering, Computational Fluid Dynam-ics (CFD), Modelling and Simulation, Structural Dy-namics and Human perception cognition and ac-tion. The project is aligned with the European Unionendeavor to reduce the rate of aviation accidentsby tackling all critical aspects of rotorcraft technol-ogy. Twelve young researches will take part in a dy-namic network composed by engineering schools(POLIMI, Liverpool University, Glasgow University
and Delft University), and industrial partners thatinclude Leonardo, a rotorcraft manufacturer, Bris-tow, a major operator, CAA Civil Aviation Authorityin UK, a certiﬁcation body, EUROCONTROL, a regu-latory body, and two independent research centers:NLR The Netherlands Aerospace Centre, specializ-ing in aviation research and the Max Plank Institutefor Biological Cybernetics which specializes in all as-pects related to the human machine interface.Exploiting the analysis undertaken by the Euro-pean branch of the IHST 11, three main threats to ro-torcraft safety have been identiﬁed, which led to thefollowing three research objectives in NITROS:
• Develop a detailed framework for rotorcraftmodeling integrating rigid-body and aero-servo-elastic modeling features, capable ofdealing with structural or propulsion or me-chanical system failures;
• Understand how humans can safely and eﬃ-ciently use and be interfaced with rotorcrafttechnology;
• Enhance the understanding of the unique andcomplex aerodynamic environment in whichrotorcraft are working, often in hostile con-ditions of wake encounter threats, undesir-able interactions with obstacles, icing and,brownout conditions.
The methodological approach developed withinthe NITROS training program will be focused onthe identiﬁcation of the interconnections that existamong the three pillars that are often overlookedduring the design.Each research program focuses on a problemthat affects the safety of current or future rotor-craft conﬁgurations. The possible implications ofthe problem in terms of manufacturing, operationsand certiﬁcation procedures will be thoroughly dis-cussed with the industrial partners.The NITORS researchers will develop two teamsto work on EHOPS.The ﬁrst team will focus on the aspects of EHOPSrelated to the interaction with the environment.In particular the aspects of systems reliability toensure EHOPS operation especially in case fail-ure, ﬂight in degraded environment, speciﬁc haz-ards and take-off and landing procedure will be re-viewed.The second group will be more focused on theinteraction with humans, looking into aspects likelevels of automation and minimum levels to be re-quired in case of failure, and training levels and ca-pabilities required to perform offshore operationsin failure conditions.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of an extended operation stan-dard (EHOPS) for offshore helicopter operation isconsidered feasible even thought speciﬁc peculiari-ties of rotorcraft design will set some challenges toovercome.The oil and gas and offshore operator industryover the years set in place several safety improve-ments and initiative, related to offshore heli-deckstandard and landing procedures, health monitor-ing system employment, collision avoidance sys-tems, ﬂight in poor weather conditions, ﬂotationsystems. However, it is the time to transform allthose initiative into something more systematic topool the different experiences into a standard.This initiative, as it has been for the ETOPS, couldresult in one of the rare compromises that can leaveeveryone happy, a win-win situationwhere all actors(manufacturers, operators, regulators, passengers,aviation professionals, society at large) could gainadvantages.In this sense also NITROS researchers, by givingtheir contribution to EHOPS exploiting their individ-ual expertise, may receive back a signiﬁcant profes-sional growth by deepening their knowledge of op-erational safety.
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